Governability and institutional power concentration: the government of FHC

Authors

  • Argelina Cheibub Figueiredo Universidade Estadual de Campinas. Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas. Departamento de Ciência Política
  • Limongi Fernando Universidade de São Paulo. Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas. Departamento de Ciência Política
  • Ana Luzia Valente Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1590/S0103-20701999000200004

Keywords:

governability, Executive-Legislative relationship, legal production, party support, legislative agenda, FHC government

Abstract

This article tries to analyses the government of FHC as part of a more general pattern of Executive-Legislative relationship which are featured by a strong concentration of power in the hands of the President and the Party leaders as well. The centralization of the decisions that is noticed in this government has institutional basis, distinguishing itself from the called "imperial presidencialism", with personalistic basis. The institutional power and the control over the legislative process have a strong impact in the legal production and in the capacity of the government in obtaining the support for his legislative agenda.

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References

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Published

1999-10-01

Issue

Vol. 11 No. 2 (1999)

Section

Dossiê FHC - 1º Governo

License

Copyright (c) 2015 Tempo Social

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

How to Cite

Figueiredo, A. C., Fernando, L., & Valente, A. L. (1999). Governability and institutional power concentration: the government of FHC . Tempo Social, 11(2), 49-62. https://doi.org/10.1590/S0103-20701999000200004