Reputation, credibility and monetary policy effectiveness

Autores

  • Gabriel Caldas Montes Universidade Federal Fluminense Autor

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1590/S0101-41612009000300009

Palavras-chave:

reputação, credibilidade, política monetária, inflação, crescimento econômico

Resumo

Como reputação e credibilidade são importantes elementos para a eficácia da política monetária, o trabalho explora os conceitos de ambos e suas importâncias em um contexto em que as políticas dos bancos centrais não são neutras, sendo capazes de afetar variáveis reais e nominais. O trabalho busca contribuir com uma nova análise de como o tipo de reputação desenvolvido pela autoridade monetária afeta o estado de expectativas e, assim, o desempenho econômico, possibilitando um caso particular que chamaremos de "armadilha de credibilidade" - a qual torna a política monetária ineficaz em afetar a atividade econômica real quando necessário. Embora a abordagem proposta pelo trabalho apresente algumas similaridades com a abordagem ortodoxa acerca da importância da reputação e da credibilidade para os bancos centrais e suas políticas, a abordagem distingue-se da ortodoxa em termos de recomendações de política monetária e do tipo de reputação que deve ser desenvolvida.

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Publicado

30-09-2009

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Como Citar

Montes, G. C. (2009). Reputation, credibility and monetary policy effectiveness . Estudos Econômicos (São Paulo), 39(3), 673-698. https://doi.org/10.1590/S0101-41612009000300009