Corporate Governance and Return on Equity of Family Control Companies and Non-Family Control Companies in Brazil.

Abstract

This study aims to evaluate, among the companies of BM&BOVESPA’s New Market (“Mercado Novo”), the significance of differences of return on equity, due to the control identity and the operation of the controlling shareholder’s relatives in the board of directors. The study is qualified as descriptive and of quantitative nature, involving all 107 companies inside BM&BOVESPA’s New Market, categorized into “family control”, “non-family control” and, among the companies with family control, “with members of the controlling family in the board of directors” and “without members of the controlling family in the board of directors”. The information were obtained through BM&BOVESPA’s and of the analyzed organizations’ websites, in addition to database Economática®. The data were treated by descriptive statistics, using the “Two Sample Test for Equal Means” method and correlation coefficient. The research identified that the proportion of family companies is rather relevant, representing nearly half of the entire sample. Furthermore, the correlation coefficient showed a strong correlation and positivity between the studied series. Finally, there was no evidence of meaningful differences of payback due to the control identity and the participation of members of the controlling family in the board of directors in none of the studied cases.