Anti-selection in the Brazilian individual health insurance market

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-41615036amj

Keywords:

Adverse selection, Anti-selection, Individual health insurance, Health insurance

Abstract

The anti-selection in the health insurance market can be a perverse phenomenon and compromising the balance of the insurance portfolio. The possibility of growing this effect is associated with the measures to guarantee the renewal of the policy and to establish a cross subsidy between the types of risks. The objective is to evaluate possible effects of the introduction of popular healthcare insurance plans in the Brazilian individual health insurance market. The results did not suggest the presence of intergenerational subsidies. But if it would be introduced products with more competitive relative prices than the current ones, the anti-selective movement of policyholders is such that it jeopardizes, without exception. Therefore, there is evidence of a clear spiral movement with deterioration of current portfolios.

 

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Author Biography

  • João Vinícius França Carvalho, Universidade de São Paulo. Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade
    João Vinícius de França Carvalho é graduado em Estatística pelo Instituto de Matemática e Estatística da Universidade de São Paulo (2007) e em Ciências Atuariais pela Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade da Universidade de São Paulo (2012). Mestre em Estatística (2011) e Doutor em Estatística (2017), ambos pelo Instituto de Matemática e Estatística da Universidade de São Paulo. Atualmente é Professor Doutor do Departamento de Contabilidade e Atuária da Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade da Universidade de São Paulo, onde se dedica a atividades de pesquisa e ensino em Ciências Atuariais. Tem experiência nas áreas de Estatística e Atuária, com ênfase em Probabilidade e Estatística Aplicadas, atuando principalmente nos seguintes temas: Matemática Atuarial de Seguros de Pessoas (Vida e Previdência), Modelagem de Seguros de Danos (Não-Vida; Patrimoniais), Teoria do Risco e da Ruína e Econometria de Séries Temporais. É membro do Instituto Brasileiro de Atuária, sob registro 2504.  

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Published

17-11-2020

Issue

Vol. 50 No. 3 (2020)

Section

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Copyright (c) 2020 Ana Carolina Maia, João Vinícius França Carvalho

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How to Cite

Maia, A. C. ., & Carvalho, J. V. F. . (2020). Anti-selection in the Brazilian individual health insurance market. Estudos Econômicos (São Paulo), 50(3), 535-568. https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-41615036amj