A economia dos custos de transação e a reforma na indústria de energia elétrica do Brasil
Keywords:
custo de transação, contratos, governança, eletricidadeAbstract
This work is meant to contribute to the study of the ongoing electric power industry in
Brazil. The transactions cost economics is the referential theorethical used to explain the
changes in the current governance structure and to assess the possible effects of the
new governance in the industry's performance. The conclusion is that, despite the
mechanisms of competition incentive, such as separating distribution, transmission and
generation, restrictions to crossownerships and self-dealing limits, the investment
especific, the volatility of the short term marginal cost, the need to central co-ordination
and of incentives to expand the installed capacity will induce the industry into a hybrid
governance, fuekked by competition and co-operation, tending more to the latter.
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Copyright (c) 1999 Edvaldo Alves de Santana, Carlos Augusto C.N.V. de Oliveira
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