Taxação ótima e movimentos migratórios em uma união monetária
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1590/S0101-41612004000300002Keywords:
migration, taxation, shocksAbstract
This article presents a simple model in which a part of a heterogeneous labor force may find it optimal to flee a state (or a country) negatively affected by an adverse economic shock. Crucially, a non-benevolent government, choosing the tax rate to maximize public revenue, has to take workers participation constraint into consideration. It is found that a negative shock lasting for a prolonged period might induce higher or lower tax rates, depending on how severe migration costs are.Downloads
References
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Copyright (c) 2004 Carlos Eduardo Soares Gonçalves
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