Are voters fiscal conservatives? Evidence from Brazilian municipal elections
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1590/S0101-41612010000100003Keywords:
reelection, local government, decentralization, fiscal federalismAbstract
Some papers in literature show that voters are fiscal conservatives, while others find evidence of a preference for fiscal profligacy. We use a traditional Probit model to analyze the preference of Brazilian municipal voters in the 2000 election. The main result suggests that voters prefer greater expenditure. We present evidence that this result is a consequence of a fiscal federalism model where there is a soft budget constraint for municipalities (institutional context). Moreover, we obtained evidence that voters with different levels of schooling impose a different result on expenditure. The effect of expenditure is more marked in municipalities with a low level of literacy.
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Atualizado em 14/08/2025