Flypaper effect revisited: evidence for tax collection efficiency in Brazilian municipalities

Authors

  • Enlinson Mattos Fundação Getúlio Vargas. Escola de Economia de São Paulo
  • Fabiana Rocha Universidade de São Paulo. Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade. Departamento de Economia
  • Paulo Arvate Fundação Getúlio Vargas. Escola de Administração de Empresas

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1590/S0101-41612011000200002

Keywords:

flypaper effect, efficiency, tax collection

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to propose a reinterpretation of the traditional flypaper effect according to which central government transfers to local governments increase public spending by more than do increases in private income. Here, higher transfers from the federal government might induce less efficiency in local tax collection opposed to the income effect. Initially, we build a model in order to point out the possible existence of that flypaper effect in a context of standard maximization on the part of local governments. Next, we construct efficiency scores for Brazilian municipalities using Free Disposable Hull (FDH), taking into consideration two outputs: amount of per capita local tax collected -tax revenue- and the size of local informal economy - tax base. Last, using two stages least squares and Tobit regressions, which the instruments is built upon the rules established in the 1988 Brazilian Constitution and where we find that unconditional transfer funds to municipalities, we estimate that transfers have the opposite effect (negative) of consumer's income on efficiency of taxation, which leads us to a reinterpretation of the flypaper effect.

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References

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Published

30-06-2011

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How to Cite

Mattos, E., Rocha, F., & Arvate, P. (2011). Flypaper effect revisited: evidence for tax collection efficiency in Brazilian municipalities. Estudos Econômicos (São Paulo), 41(2), 239-267. https://doi.org/10.1590/S0101-41612011000200002