Competição em preços entre corretores de seguros de automóveis
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1590/S0101-41612011000400003Keywords:
Sem palavras-chaveAbstract
The final price in a contract of automobile insurance depends not only the insurance company, but also the insurance agent. Thus, the agent is able to change the mechanism initially designed by the insurer, distorting the allocation of risk between the parts. This article adapts the model of Stahl (1989) to automobile insurance market in order to explain the agent's strategic behavior. The model predicts that the expected value of the commission rate chosen by the agent is a decreasing function of the premium required by the insurer. This prediction was tested and confirmed empirically using data on sales of policies in the Brazilian market. In practice, this article gives to the insurers more control over the final price, which drives to a more efficient allocation of risk in this market.
Downloads
References
Aurichio, B. C. e Braido, L. H. B. (2010). Dynamic Price Competition in Auto-Insurance Brokerage. Tese de Doutorado, Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia (EPGE-FGV), Capítulo 1, 2-33.
Barron, J. M., Taylor, B. A. e Umbeck, J. R. (2004). Number of sellers, average prices, and price dispersion. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 22(8-9), 1041-1066.
Benabou, R., e Gertner, R. (1993). Search with Learning from Prices: Does Increased Inflationary Uncertainty Lead to Higher Markups. The Review of Economic Studies, 60(1), 69-93.
Burdett, K., e Judd, K. L. (1983). Equilibrium Price Dispersion. Econometrica, 51(4), 955-970.
Carlson, J. A., e McAfee, R. P. (1983). Discrete Equilibrium Price Dispersion. The Journal of Political Economy, 91(3), 480-493.
Chandra, A. e Tappata, M. (2009). Consumer Search and Dynamic Price Dispersion. An Application to Gasoline Markets. Working paper.
Chiappori, P. A., Julien, B., Salanié, B. e Salanié, F. (2006). Asymmetric Information in Insurance: General Testable Implications. RAND Journal of Economics, 37(4), 783-798.
Dahlby, B., e West, D. S. (1986). Price Dispersion in an Automobile Insurance Market. The Journal of Political Economy, 94(2), 418-438.
Diamond, P. A. (1971). A model of price adjustment. Journal of Economic Theory, 3(2), 156-168.
MacMinn, R. D. (1980). Search and Market Equilibrium. The Journal of Political Economy, 88(2), 308-327.
Reinganum, J. F. (1979). A Simple Model of Equilibrium Price Dispersion. The Journal of Political Economy, 87(4), 851-858.
Rothschild, M. e Stiglitz, J. (1976). Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90(4), 629-49.
Sorensen, A. T. (2000). Equilibrium Price Dispersion in Retail Markets for Prescription Drugs. Journal of Political Economy, 108(4), 833-850.
Stahl, Dale O. (1989). Olipolistic pricing with sequential consumer search. American Economic Review, 79(4), 700-712.
Stigler, G. (1961). The economics of information. Journal of Political Economy, 69, 213-225.
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2011 Bruno Cesar Aurichio Ledo
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
By submitting an article, the author authorizes its publication and attests that it has not been submitted to any other journal. The original article is considered final. Articles selected for publication are proofread for grammatical and orthographic errors. The journal does not pay rights for published articles. The Institute of Economic Research from the School of Economics, Business and Accounting of the University of São Paulo (Instituto de Pesquisas Econômicas da Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade da Universidade de São Paulo) owns the journal's copyright.
