Sobre o estatuto epistemológico da racionalidade econômica segundo Karl Popper
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1590/S0101-41612014000400007Keywords:
Epistemology of the economics science, Karl Popper, Postulate of rationalityAbstract
Three types of criticism are currently raised against the acceptance of the rationality
principle in economic science. The first relates to the circularity of the reasoning, the
second concerns the protection of the theory against refutation, and the third – the most
relevant – concerns the empirical inadequacy of the concept. This article aims to discuss
the last criticism, considering the work performed by Popper, in different moments of his career, devoted to determine the epistemological status of the rationality principle.
There are three main possible answers to be examined below. The first suggests that
this postulate be considered as a general law of human behavior. The second requires it
to function as an axiom of the theory. Finally, the answer to the third criticism sees the
rationality postulate as a methodological rule. The article is finished with a statement
that the last solution is a good answer to the core of the above referred criticisms to
the conventional concept of rationality. Therefore it is concluded that, as far as it is
situated in a metatheoretical context, the rationality postulate embraces undeniable
importance as a foundation of economic theory. Its absence or non-existence would
imply the unavailability of instruments leading to the very selection of the empirical
data designed to submit the theory to tests.
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