Infrações ambientais e a reputação do regulador: análise em dados de painel para o Brasil
Keywords:
Environmental infractions, Fines, formal regulation, Spillover effects, Panel dataAbstract
The aim of this paper is to test the role of the regulator in combating environmental
infractions in Brazil. The main explanatory variables are the values of fines imposed
on the state (specific effect) and on surrounding states (spillover effect), which reflect
the reputation of the regulator. This paper also examines the complementary role of
private agents on monitoring and application of informal sanctions. The data source
comprises, at state level, the amount of notices of violation recorded by IBAMA and the
related fines for the years 2000 to 2011. The results obtained by the method of Fixed
Effects demonstrate that an increase on the values of fines imposed on a state and its
neighbors generates a reduction in the number of notices of infraction for the years
following the imposition of a fine.
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