Quais os impactos da desaposentação? Um estudo para as aposentadorias por tempo de contribuição do Regime Geral de Previdência Social
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1590/1980-53574443ajlKeywords:
Social security, Re-retirement, Actuarial fairnessAbstract
This study aims to evaluate the impacts of re-retirement, a term used when an Brazilian
insured INSS retires, but remains in the formal labor market, and asks recalculation of
the pension benefit due to the increase in the contribution period. There is an important
tradeoff: the more the insured take to ask re-retirement, the greater the increase
in the value of the benefit. However, the time of enjoyment of this gain will be less.
Conversely, the more premature re-retirement, the lower the effective increase in the period and greater enjoyment. The theoretical framework is based on the concepts
of actuarial justice and actuarial neutrality. Were employed four indicators used in the
literature pension: Replacement Rate, Internal Rate of Return, Necessary Rate and
Effective Rate. The results show an optimal period for re-retirement: at least 4.83
years (men) and 7.83 years for (women). If the return of the benefit is required before
the recalculation, there is no advantage in re-retirement.
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