Debt renegotiation with incomplete contract
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1590/S0101-41612005000300003Keywords:
incomplete contract, debt contract, renegotiationAbstract
A debt contract usually does not include a provision about renegotiation. The right to seize the borrowers asset and the rules of this process are usually stipulated in the contract. Such a promise not to renegotiate is not credible since renegotiation can mitigate the dead-weight loss of liquidating insolvent borrowers. Once the initial contract may not consider the renegotiation procedure and renegotiation may occur, this paper investigates why a complete contract is not offered. It shows that the lender does not need to stipulate the renegotiation procedure on the initial contract because he is indifferent about committing or not to the terms of a contract. This indicates that a complete contract gives the lender the same expected return as an incomplete contract, in which the renegotiation process is determined after the occurrence of default.Downloads
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