The sentences without Subjects and the Structure of the Proposition

Abstract

The sentences without subject that confront the classical definition of the proposition to which the subject-predicate structure is predicted are analyzed in the present article. We are going to comment the assumptions and implications regarding the traditional analysis of Said Ali (1950) as well as the generative analysis concerning this matter. According to this theoretical framework, a formal condition, namely, the T (tense) category, head of the sentence, disposing a D-feature, by means from which is addressed the extended projection principle (EPP), it demands that the subject’s position must be, invariably, occupied by a component that might or might not be realized phonologically, and interpreted thematically or not (Chomsky, 1995; Shim, 2001). Nevertheless, the generative solution is exclusively formal and does not solve the problem with the occurrence of a component functioning as a predicate, but that is not, according to Frege, saturated, that is, it does not in fact, preach any component. Considering that, in sentences without subjects that refer to time and are also existential, it is subjacent, inherently, that such formulations concern to what does or does not exist or to the time in a generic place or in a specific place undetermined, we cogitate the hypothesis that, in such wordings, the predicate is extracted through a sort of analytical judgment, resorting to a semantic operation, a null or unpronounced locative, which obtains a component that ends up functioning as the subject of these sentences in the sense of a logical or psychological subject as proposed by Paul (1970[1880]).