Conflicts of agency: a comparative study of issues attached to s and traditional companies and credit cooperative

Authors

  • Romeu Eugênio de Lima Banco Central do Brasil
  • Marcelo Bicalho Viturino de Araújo Banco Central do Brasil
  • Hudson Fernandes Amaral Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais; Faculdade de Ciências Econômicas

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.11606/rco.v2i4.34726

Keywords:

Credit unions, traditional companies, Agency Theory, agency conflicts

Abstract

The purpose of this article is, based on the relevant bibliography, to analyze and compare potential agency conflicts in two different kinds of organizations: traditional companies and credit unions. This is justified by the fact that credit unions are the less studied financial institutions, although, nowadays, they play an important role in Brazilian government access credit policies. Furthermore, agency conflicts and their minimization are considered viability and risk reduction instruments. There are different agency conflicts in credit unions compared with the ones observed in traditional companies. This may indicative that different governance solutions are necessary to credit unions. However, some authors suggest that agency conflicts in credit unions can be solved by generic actions, such as: well-defined rules, efficient internal controls, service adequacy, prudential rules adoption and extern supervision. These approaches are the same adopted in traditional companies, what, in principle, would be considered a paradox if we consider that agency conflicts are different in credit unions.

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Published

2008-12-01

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How to Cite

Lima, R. E. de, Araújo, M. B. V. de, & Amaral, H. F. (2008). Conflicts of agency: a comparative study of issues attached to s and traditional companies and credit cooperative . Revista De Contabilidade E Organizações, 2(4), 148-157. https://doi.org/10.11606/rco.v2i4.34726