Mineral wealth, weak institutions and clientelism: the natural resources curse for local governments
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1982-6486.rco.2019.153089Keywords:
Natural resources, Institutions, ClientelismAbstract
This article analyzes the role of institutions in the relationship between royalties from mineral wealth in the municipality and the probability of using this revenue for clientelist actions. We analyzed, for 2013 to 2016, whether the mayors in Minas Gerais State used the royalties of the mining to increase job positions in the cityhall and spending on materials, goods, and services for free distribution. Additionally, we analyzed whether the possibility of re-election of mayors or the transparency of public spending interfered on the propensity of such clientelist practices. The evidences indicate that there is a strong association of higher royalty revenue with a disproportionate number of commissioned positions. The transparency of public expenditures was not sufficient to annul this effect and has further exacerbated by the possibility of the mayors applying for re-election.
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References
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sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2393605>. Acesso em: maio 2019.
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empírico nos municípios do estado do Espírito Santo. Revista de Administração Pública, v.52, n.5, pp.880-
898. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0034-7612172594.
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matter?. Journal of Macroeconomics, 37, 285-298. DOI: 10.1016/j.jmacro.2013.05.006
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pdf>. Acesso em: maio 2019.
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American political science Review, 105(1), 1-26. Disponível em: < https://www.jstor.org/stable/41480824>.
Acesso em: maio 2019.
Havranek, T., Horvath, R., & Zeynalov, A. (2016). Natural resources and economic growth: A meta-analysis.
World Development, 88, 134-151. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.07.016
James, A. (2015). The resource curse: A statistical mirage?. Journal of Development Economics, 114, 55-63. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2014.10.006
Karl, T. L. (1997). The paradox of plenty: Oil booms and petro-states (Vol. 26). Univ of California Press. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.2307/2586177
Kasekende, E., Abuka, C., & Sarr, M. (2016). Extractive industries and corruption: Investigating the effectiveness
of EITI as a scrutiny mechanism. Resources Policy, 48, 117-128. DOI: 10.1016/j.resourpol.2016.03.002
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curse’debate. Limestone mining in the Krobo region of Ghana. Resources Policy, 54, 43-52. DOI: https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2017.08.005
Loayza, N., & Rigolini, J. (2016). The local impact of mining on poverty and inequality: evidence from the
commodity boom in Peru. World Development, 84, 219-234. DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.03.005
Mahdavy, H., & Cook, M. (1970). The patterns and problems of economic development in rentier states: The case
of Iran. life, 1000(1).
Mahdavi, P. (2015). Explaining the oil advantage: effects of natural resource wealth on incumbent reelection in
Iran. World Politics, 67(2), 226-267. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887114000392
Maldonado, S. (2014). The political effects of resource booms: Political outcomes, clientelism and public goods
provision in Peru. Unpublished Manuscript, University of California, Berkeley. Disponível em: < http://sites.
bu.edu/neudc/files/2014/10/paper_496.pdf>. Acesso em: maio 2019.
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How to Cite
Rodrigues, A. de C., & Rodrigues, S. B. (2019). Mineral wealth, weak institutions and clientelism: the natural resources curse for local governments. Revista De Contabilidade E Organizações, 13, e153089. https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1982-6486.rco.2019.153089
