The debate on interpretation in contemporary jurisprudence: conventionalism (Marmor) versus interpretivism (Dworkin)
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.2318-8235.v115p313-334Keywords:
Jurisprudence, Philosophy of Law, Interpretation, Ronald Dworkin, Andrei MarmorAbstract
This paper is about the visions of legal interpretation in contemporary jurisprudence, and approaches the criticism that Andrei Marmor directed to Ronald Dworkin. Marmor is an exclusivist-positivist; in his opinion, moral judgements do not affect the definition of valid law. He is also a conventionalist, then understanding that such definition is based on social facts of recognition of validity by the authorities. He criticized Dworkin’s “interpretivist” view, mainly in two points. Whereas Dworkin proposes a model of interpretation based on theoretical disagreements about what the law demands (in objective moral terms), Marmor states an interpretation model based on author’s intentions (not of an empirical subject, but of a referent constructed by the interpreter). Whereas Dworkin proposes that jurisprudential statements are in competition with the practical judgements by legal interpreters, Marmor tries to reaffirm a position of external observation for jurisprudence, following H. L. A. Hart.
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