Monetary reform credibility: some evidence for Brazil
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.11606/1980-53572734frPalavras-chave:
credibilidade, restrição orçamentária do governo, probabilidade subjetiva, planos cruzado e collorResumo
O objefivo desse artigo e discufir a credibilidade de duos reformas de combate a inflagao adotadas no Brasil: os Pianos Cruzado e Collor. Assume-se que a origem do problema de credibilidade vem da interagdo entre as auforidades monetdria e fiscal estabelecida pela resfrigdo orgamenfdria infertemporal. Credibilidade e definida como
a probabilidade subjetiva de que o governo esta seguindo as politicas por ele anunciadas. Os resultados obfidos indicam que ambas as reformas monetdrias encorajaram uma polJfica para a autoridade monetdria, que seria apropriada para um regime ricardiano, mas estabeleceram pianos de imposfos e gastos que seriam facfiveis
somenfe num regime de domindncia fiscal. Tais politicas monetdria e fiscal sdo, contudo, incompatfveis. Ndo e factivel levar adiante ambas ao mesmo tempo e isso explica a baixa credibilidade global e, em ultima instdncia, o fracasso, das duos reformas economicas.
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