Detecting Earnings management in Brazil: estimating discretionary accruals

Abstract

This paper analyzes classic models used in international academic literature to estimate discretionary accruals, which are an empirical proxy to detect earnings management. Additionally, it provides evidence that Brazilian public companies practice earnings management in response to capital market incentives. Initially, some important concepts are clarified, such as accruals and discretionary accruals. After a critical analysis of the main accruals model, the Kang & Silvaramakrishnan model (1995) was implemented in the context of Brazilian companies, which is technically considered the most accurate model for Brazil. To check the robustness of the model, circumstances were investigated where there were strong incentives to practice earnings management. The results confirm the earnings management hypothesis. Evidences were documented that Brazilian public companies manage their earnings to: a) Avoid reporting losses; b) Sustain recent performance and c) Worsen the current net income in order to have better future results (take a bath).